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Chemerinsky: Closing the Courthouse Doors

LECTURE

CLOSING THE COURTHOUSE DOORS:
TRANSCRIPT OF THE 2010 HONORABLE JAMES R.
BROWNING DISTINGUISHED LECTURE IN LAW
Erwin Chemerinsky*

Editors' Note: The Montana Law Review was honored to have Dean Erwin
Chemerinsky deliver the 2010 Honorable James R. Browning Distinguished
Lecture in Law on March 8, 2010. Each year since 2002, the Browning
Lecture has brought distinguished scholars and judges from across the
country to The University of Montana School of Law. Dean Chemerinsky's
Lecture and visit to the School of Law certainly furthered that tradition. As
its namesake indicates, the Browning Lecture honors the Honorable James
R. Browning of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.
Judge Browning was a member of the first editorial board of the Montana
Law Review and ultimately served as Editor-in-Chief He served with distinction for many years as Chief Judge for the Ninth Circuit and continues
to serve on that court today.
I.

LAWSUITS AGAINST FEDERAL OFICIALS

The names Valerie Plame and Joe Wilson, I am sure, are familiar to all
of you. But I want to tell you a part of the story that is less familiar. I want
to talk about what happened to them when they filed a civil lawsuit in federal court, because I think the outcome of their lawsuit is very typical of
what is going on in the federal courts in the last several decades.
* Erwin Chemerinsky is the Founding Dean of the School of Law, University of California-Irvine.
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Just to refresh your recollection, Valerie Plame, for many years, was a
secret agent in the CIA. I learned that there are different degrees of secrecy
among operatives. She was the most secret of secret operatives. Her husband, Joe Wilson, was in the Diplomatic Corps from 1976 to 1998. He
served as the deputy ambassador to Iraq. He also served as the ambassador
to some African nations.
In the early part of the last decade, there were rumors that Iraq was
seeking to buy uranium in countries of Africa. The government asked Joe
Wilson to go in and investigate. He came to the conclusion that there was
no basis to the rumors. Iraq was not, in fact, seeking to buy uranium to
build nuclear weapons. However, in the State of the Union Address, on
January 28, 2003, President George W. Bush said that Iraq was seeking to
buy uranium from nations in Africa. Soon after, some reporters investigated and discovered that this was not true. In fact, they found out that a
former deputy ambassador had gone to Africa to investigate and found no
basis for this. The spotlight then turned to the ambassador who wrote an
op-ed in the New York Times in June of 2003 revealing that, indeed, he had
gone to Africa, and there was no basis for President Bush's statement that
Iraq was seeking to buy uranium.
At this time, those at the highest levels of American governmentVice President Dick Cheney; his top aide Lewis Libby; aide to the President, Karl Rove; and Deputy Secretary of State Rick Armitage-set out in a
concerted effort to punish Joe Wilson for what he had done to embarrass the
Bush Administration. They learned that Wilson's wife, Valerie Plame, was
a secret agent, and they systematically set out to leak this information to
reporters, such as Judith Miller of the New York Times, a reporter at Time
magazine, and others. Karl Rove told Chris Matthews from Hardball that
Valerie Plame was now "fair game." That is what she decided to title her
autobiography.
The problem with being a secret agent is that once it is revealed that
you are doing that, you can no longer be one. Her career as an operative
was effectively destroyed. Also, she and Joe Wilson felt that their family's
lives were in danger. She worked on so many missions for the government
that she feared retaliation once people learned that, in fact, she had been a
secret agent. When I first met Valerie Plame, I was very impressed by her.
My first thought was that I could not imagine that she was a secret agent.
But, of course, I realized that is probably exactly why she was so effective.
In the spring of 2006, I received a phone call from a lawyer in Washington saying that Valerie and Joe wanted to file a civil lawsuit against Vice
President Cheney, Libby, Rove, and Armitage for the harms that were done
to them. They asked if I would be willing to represent Plame and Wilson
on a pro bono basis. I eagerly agreed. We filed our lawsuit in July of 2006,
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calculating a three-year statute of limitations running from the time their
identity was revealed to reporters. As you may know, there is no federal
statute that authorizes civil lawsuits against federal officials who violate the
Constitution. If local officials violate the Constitution, they can be sued
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. But § 1983 does not apply to federal officials.
Instead, if someone wants to sue a federal official for a constitutional
violation, it has to be done through what is called a "Bivens suit." This
takes its name from a 1971 United States Supreme Court decision, Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,' where the
Supreme Court said that it is possible to sue a federal official for violating
the Constitution. That is exactly what the lawsuit for Valerie Plame Wilson
and Joe Wilson was founded on. I thought we had strong constitutional
claims. For Joe Wilson, it was a First Amendment claim. He was punished
by those in the highest levels of government for his speech. For both Valerie and Joe, there were privacy claims. For Valerie there was a claim that
she had been deprived of her property, her job, her liberty, and her safety
without due process.
Predictably, all of the defendants moved to dismiss. Not so predictably, I lost in a 2-1 decision from the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit. The opinion was written by Judge David
Sentelle. He gave two reasons why their lawsuit-their Bivens claimscould not go forward. One was that there is a statute that provides relief.
He said that the Supreme Court had indicated that if there is a statute that
provides relief, that is "a special factor counseling hesitation" that precludes
a Bivens suit. But what was the statute that Judge Sentelle pointed to? The
Privacy Act. However, the Privacy Act here did not apply. It did not apply
at all to Joe Wilson's claim. The United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit previously ruled that there is only a claim
under the Privacy Act if it is information about you that is being revealed.
There was nothing about Joe Wilson disclosed. He had no cause of action
under the Privacy Act.
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has held that the Privacy
Act does not apply to the Office of the President and Vice President. So
neither Valerie nor Joe had claims against Vice President Cheney, Libby, or
Rove at all. The D.C. Circuit was saying that a statute that does not apply
can preclude constitutional claims. I am skeptical that a statute can ever
preclude constitutional claims. But how can a statute that does not apply
preclude the ability to sue under the United States Constitution?
The second ground that was given by Judge Sentelle was even more
questionable. He said that this civil suit might risk the disclosure of confi1. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
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dential information. Of course, it was the defendants that chose to reveal
that Valerie Plame was a secret operative. In my brief I said that this argument is like a child who kills his parents and pleads for mercy for being an
orphan. Additionally, it is completely speculative whether this case would
reveal confidential information. There had already been the criminal prosecution and conviction of Lewis Libby. All the facts that were needed for
the lawsuit came out publicly during that trial. Besides, there are many
ways in which courts can protect confidential information. Perhaps, it
would turn out, as the suit progressed, that one of the claims might need to
be dismissed if there was no other way to protect the confidential information. But to grant a motion to dismiss on that basis had no grounds whatsoever. I sought review from the United States Supreme Court. On June 22,
2009, the Supreme Court denied certiorari.
The reason I start with this story is because although Valerie and Joe
are certainly more high profile than most plaintiffs, their story is not unique.
It is very difficult to win a Bivens action in the federal courts. No Bivens
action has been successful in the United States Supreme Court in decades.
To give you another example of an unsuccessful Bivens action, consider United States v. Stanley.2 Stanley served in the United States Army in
the 1950s. Unknown to him, he was subjected to human experimentation.
The Army told Stanley and other soldiers that they were testing some new
gear and they gave them injections. He was given, without his consent or
knowledge, LSD. He said that as a result throughout his life he suffered
flashbacks that interfered with his functioning. The United States, in the
most eloquent language, condemned human experimentation during the Nuremberg Trials. Stanley sued the military officials who were responsible
for this. He lost in the United States Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision. The
Supreme Court said that those in the military cannot sue superior officers
even, when here, it was outside of combat. And, even when here, the government's actions violated every protocol of human rights, the refusal to
allow lawsuits for constitutional violations by federal officials is one example of how the courthouse doors have been closed.
What I would like to do this afternoon is pick three other examples
where the Supreme Court closed the door even to those who had meritorious claims. All were 5-4 decisions with the five most conservative justices
in the majority. Based on these examples, I will draw some overall conclusions of what has happened in the American justice system.

2. U.S. v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987).
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HEIGHTENED PLEADING REQUIREMENTS

The first example is the heightened pleading requirements now being
imposed in federal court. From the time the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were adopted in the 1930s, it was always said that they ushered in a
system known as "notice pleading." I have always taught my students that
notice pleading was best embodied by a Supreme Court case in 1957, Conley v. Gibson.3 There, the Supreme Court said that a complaint should be
dismissed only if there is no set of facts upon which relief can be granted.
The Supreme Court, as well as many others, said on countless occasions,
that the philosophy of the federal rules was to make it easy for a plaintiff to
get into federal court and easy to withstand a motion to dismiss-that
screening was to be done at the summary judgment stage, not at the motion
to dismiss stage.
That definitely meant there would be some instances where the defendants were subjected to needless litigation. But it was thought unfair to
require that the plaintiffs prove their case in order to get into court. Often,
crucial evidence is possessed only by the defendants. Often, it would be
available to plaintiffs only through discovery. To require that plaintiffs
plead it in the complaint would keep them out of court.
All of this began to change in 2007 when the Supreme Court decided
Bell Atlantic v. Twombly. 4 Bell Atlantic was about how much needed to be
pled in a complaint under § 1 of the Sherman Act,5 for conspiracy in restraint of trade. Over the course of the majority opinion, approving the
dismissal of the complaint, the Court said that Conley v. Gibson was "abrogated." The dissenting opinion by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg said that
Conley v. Gibson was "interred." I assume that "abrogated" and "interred"
are synonyms for "overruled," but the Supreme Court did not say that. In
fact, in November of 2008, there was a national conference of federal courts
of appeals judges in Washington D.C. For each topic, they paired a Supreme Court justice with two law professors. For the panel on civil litigation they had Justice Breyer. I was surprised over the course of the question
and answer period to hear the federal court of appeals judges' sense of
frustration. With even an anger in their voice, many said, "What is the
standard of pleading after Bell Atlantic v. Twombly?" Finally Justice
Breyer responded, with frustration and perhaps anger in his voice, saying
that Bell Atlantic v. Twombly is just an antitrust case. It turns out that Jus-

3. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41 (1957).
4. Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
5. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7.
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tice Breyer was wrong, and that is why a decision from last spring, Ashcroft
v. Iqbal,6 is so important.
For any of you who litigate civil cases in federal court or any of you
who are students who will do civil litigation in federal court, this is the most
important Supreme Court decision in years. When I checked last month,
there were already 6,000 federal court cases citing to Ashcroft v. Iqbal. It
will soon be the most frequently cited Supreme Court case by the lower
federal courts in all of American history, and it was decided just last spring.
Iqbal was a man of Pakistani descent. He was held in New York after
September 11th. Upon his release, he sued 53 defendants including the
then-Attorney-General, John Ashcroft, and the director of the FBI. Iqbal
maintained that his detention and treatment violated the Constitution. The
Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision held that Iqbal's complaint should be dismissed. Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion for the Court, joined by Chief
Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas, and Justice Alito. Justice
Kennedy said that the new standard for pleading in federal courts is one of
"plausibility." A plaintiff must allege enough facts so that a court can conclude it is plausible the plaintiff might recover.
I have taught civil procedure many times. I always instructed my students that when a court assesses a motion to dismiss it is supposed to accept
that the allegations of the complaints are true. No longer is that the case
after Ashcroft v. Iqbal. The Supreme Court said that a court is not to accept
a conclusory allegation of fact as true. The Supreme Court said that a district court should go through the complaint, exclude all of the conclusory
allegations of fact, exclude all the statements of law, and then decide, based
on what remains, if it is plausible that the plaintiff might recover. To see
how radical this is in changing the law, pick up any copy of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and look at the model complaints that were placed
there by the Federal Rules Advisory Committee. Each and every one of
them would have to be dismissed after Ashcroft v. Iqbal because they contain nothing but conclusory allegations of fact.
It has long been established that credibility of a witness is not to be
determined on a motion to dismiss. In fact, it has been established that the
credibility of a witness is not to be decided on a motion for summary judgment. Credibility should be an issue for a jury. Yet, if you read Justice
Kennedy's majority opinion, the Court ordered that the claims against Ashcroft and the director of the FBI be dismissed because the Justice found the
allegations not to be credible.
What does plausibility mean as a standard of pleading? The only guidance the Supreme Court gave was to say that a district court should decide
6. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009).
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based on context and common sense. What that means is that it all depends
on the luck of the draw and who your district judge is. What is plausible
and credible to one district judge is not going to be plausible and credible to
another.
How is there to be appellate review under this standard? It has long
been established that a court of appeal is to review a dismissal for failure to
state a claim de novo. Does that then mean that the federal court of appeals
is to substitute for the district court its own judgment of what is plausible?
To me, what is striking about this decision is how it will close the courthouse door to many people with meritorious claims. There are going to be
countless individuals who suffered injuries, even egregious constitutional
violations, who will not have the evidence at the time of writing the complaint to be able to go forward. They need to be able to get to discovery,
which will not be available to them.
In 1993, in a case called Leatherman v. TarrantCounty Texas,7 and in
2002, in a case called Swierkievicz v. Sorema N.A. , the Supreme Court in
unanimous decisions upheld that notice pleading is the standard of federal
courts. Yet, here in two cases, in 2007 and 2009, the Supreme Court has
dramatically changed the standard of pleading in virtually every civil case
in federal court. There has been no change in Rule 8, no change in Rule
12(b)(6). Congress did not exercise its authority under the Federal Rules
Enabling Act to revise the Rules of Civil Procedure. This was nothing except the five conservative justices on the Court making it harder for those
with claims to get access to the federal judiciary.
III.

SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY

The second example that I want to talk about is the great expansion of
the scope of sovereign immunity. I have often felt that the concept of sovereign immunity was inconsistent with the rule of law. It did not surprise
me that with the fall of the Soviet Union, one of the first things that the
Russian Government did was eliminate sovereign immunity. Sovereign immunity in the United States is derived from English law. It is based on the
principle that "the king can do no wrong." It is inconsistent in a nation that
rejects royal prerogatives, and, going all the way back to Marbury v.
Madison,9 it has been said that no person, not even the President, is above
the law. There is only one provision in the Constitution that pertains to
sovereign immunity. It is the Eleventh Amendment, and it provides sovereign immunity only in a very limited context. It says that the judicial power
7. Leatherman v. Tarrant Co. Tex., 507 U.S. 163 (1993).
8. Swierkievicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002)
9. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
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in the United States shall not extend to a suit against the state by citizens of
other states or citizens of foreign countries. As demonstrated in historical
research by two federal courts of appeals judges in separate articles, John
Gibbons and William Fletcher, the purpose of this Amendment was simply
to stop states from being sued when the only ground for jurisdiction was
diversity of citizenship. It was not meant to stop a suit against the state for
constitutional violations or other federal violations.
In 1989, in a case called Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,10 the United
States Supreme Court said that sovereign immunity does not bar a suit
against a state, pursuant to a federal statute. Congress, if it does so expressly, can authorize suits against state governments. But the Court
quickly has overruled this, and one of the important legal developments
over the last decade has been the tremendous expansion of the scope of
sovereign immunity. The bottom line, and the reason I am talking about it
this afternoon, is the way it closes the courthouse doors to those with injuries and prevents them from gaining recovery.
The Rehnquist Court successfully expanded sovereign immunity in a
couple ways. First it said that Congress, by statute, generally cannot authorize suits against state governments. In 1996, in the Seminole Tribe of
Florida v. Florida," the Supreme Court expressly overruled Pennsylvania
v. Union Gas Co. What changed between 1989 and 1996? Why did the
Court overrule a decision that was just seven years old? Had the Court
found some musty history of the Eleventh Amendment that led them to
believe they had made a mistake? Had Pennsylvania v. Union Gas proven
impossible to administer in practice? The only difference was that Justice
Thurgood Marshall had been replaced by Justice Clarence Thomas, and Justice Thomas cast the deciding fifth vote to shift the balance in the other
direction, joining the justice who had written the dissent in Pennsylvania v.
Union Gas Co.
The Supreme Court quickly followed this decision by holding that,
under many different federal laws, injured individuals cannot sue state governments. For example, in 1999, in College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board,1 2 the Supreme Court held
that state governments could not be sued for patent infringement.
Not long ago, I was doing a talk in another state to the judges there,
and since I was using some copyright material prepared by somebody else, I
said to the coordinator of judicial education that I would get a copyright
release. She said, "Oh, we do not worry about that anymore. Ever since the
Supreme Court decided Florida Prepaidwe cannot be sued for copyright
10. Pa. v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
11. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
12. Say. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999).
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infringement, so we do not worry about it." What if some enterprising state
university would decide to download my casebook and my treatises and
make them available for free to the students? Make it a hypothetical professor who has case books and treatises and who is saving the royalties, such
that they are, for his hypothetical four children's college education. He is
out of luck. Maybe he can sue the individual professors for money damages. In all likelihood those professors are judgment proof or close to it.
But there is no ability to sue the state university. Now, contrary to what
you law students think, law professors who write textbooks and treatises do
not get all that much in royalties. But there are instances of patent infringements by state governments that are worth millions or billions of dollars.
And there is no ability to sue the state.
In subsequent cases the Supreme Court said that the plaintiffs could
not sue states for civil rights violations. In Kimel v. FloridaBoard of Regents,'3 the Supreme Court said that states cannot be sued for violating the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act.14 In Board of Trustees of University ofAlabama v. Garrett,'5 the Supreme Court said that those with disabilities cannot sue under Title 1 of the American Disabilities Act if it is employment discrimination on the base of disabilities. Again, there might be
the ability to sue the individual state officers. But the Supreme Court has
made those suits more difficult, as well. The tremendous expansion of sovereign immunity means that the courthouse door is often closed to those
with serious injuries, including civil rights violations.
The other way in which the Supreme Court expanded sovereign immunity was by increasing the fora where states could assert it. The key case
here was Alden v. Mainel6 in 1999. My guess is that, unless you have taken
federal courts or maybe a constitutional law class that covered it, you would
have never heard of Alden v. Maine. Yet I think it is one of the most important decisions of the Rehnquist Court. One of the most revealing things
about it is its attitude towards constitutional and statutory claims and the
importance of access to the federal courts. The case involved probation
officers in the State of Maine who alleged that they were owed overtime
pay under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act.' 7 The Supreme Court had
ruled that the federal Fair Labor Standards Act does apply to the states. The
probation officers sued in federal court, but after Seminole Tribe the case
was thrown out. Congress by statute cannot authorize suits against state
governments. So the probations officers sued in Maine State Court.
13. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).

14. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634.
15. Bd. of Trustees of U. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001).
16. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).

17. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219.

Published by ScholarWorks at University of Montana, 2010

9

Montana Law Review, Vol. 71 [2010], Iss. 2, Art. 2

MONTANA LAW REVIEW

294

Vol. 71

There is no constitutional provision about sovereign immunity of states
in state courts. The Eleventh Amendment is the only provision, and it refers to just suits against states in federal courts. But the Supreme Court in a
5-4 decision ruled that state governments have sovereign immunity and
cannot be sued in state court even on federal claims. The split was the same
as in Seminole Tribe with Justice Kennedy writing for the court, joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O'Connor, Justice Scalia, and Justice
Thomas. Justice Kennedy said the silence of the Framers here indicates that
they assumed that states could not be sued in federal court. Silence is inherently ambiguous. Maybe the Framers were silent because they assumed
that states could not be sued. Maybe they were silent because they assumed
that states could be sued. Or likely they were silent because they did not
think about the issue at all. Most of the states that existed then did not have
sovereign immunity protecting themselves from being sued in state court.
The Solicitor General of the United States at the time, Seth Waxman,
argued to the justices that it is impossible to ensure the supremacy of federal law if states cannot be sued and held accountable. In his oral argument,
he quoted to the justices from Article VI in the Constitution, which says
that the Constitution, the statutes, and the treaties made pursuant to it, are
the supreme law of the land.
Under roman numeral IHl of his opinion, Justice Kennedy addresses
this, and he said, the trust in the "good faith of the states .

.

. provides an

adequate assurance" of the supremacy of federal law.' 8 What is the remedy
for state violations of the constitution of federal laws? Trust in the good
faith of state governments. Can you imagine in the late 1950s and the
1960s at the height of the civil rights movement, the Supreme Court saying,
"no need for federal court oversight compliance with desegregation, we will
trust the good faith of state governments"? James Madison said that if people were angels there would be no need for a constitution. But there would
be no need for a government either. The reality is there are times when
state governments intentionally and inadvertently will violate people's
rights. And Alden v. Maine means they cannot be sued in federal court or
state court or any forum. The courthouse door has simply been slammed
shut.
IV.

ARBITRATION

As for the fourth and final example, I again will start with a personal
story. Not long ago I went to a doctor for the first time for a routine
checkup. As I got to the desk the receptionist gave me a stack of papers to
fill out. I noticed that one of them included a form that I would waive any
18. Alden, 527 U.S. at 755.
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ability to sue the doctor for malpractice or other claims and that instead I
would agree to go to binding arbitration. I went back to the receptionist and
I said, "Will the doctor see me if I do not sign this form?" She said, "I do
not know. Nobody's ever asked that question." I assume that it was not a
new form. It was stunning to me that nobody had ever asked; everybody
routinely signed it. Thankfully, the doctor was willing to see me without
signing the form. As far as I know, thankfully, no malpractice was committed.
Not long before that, I was teaching Civil Procedure, and I was coming
to the part of the course where we talk about alternative dispute resolution
and arbitration. I had just bought a new computer from Dell, and I confess
that I am one of those lawyers who often does not read what I sign. But in
this instance I decided to look, and sure enough paragraph seven was an
arbitration clause. It agreed that if I had any dispute with Dell about my
computer, it would go to binding arbitration, and it even designated where
the matter would be arbitrated. I wrote Dell back a letter saying that I did
not accept paragraph seven, binding arbitration, and that by opening my
letter they consented that I could take them to court to sue. They did not
respond.
To me, one of the disturbing trends in the Supreme Court in the last
decade or so has been a great emphasis in shifting cases away from juries
and courts towards arbitration. Let me be clear, I am not against arbitration.
I think it serves a very important function in many kinds of disputes. But I
also tremendously value the ability of people to go to a court to be before a
jury, and that is what is lost with regard to arbitration.
The key case, I think, was one decided in 2001, Circuit City Stores,
Inc. v. Adams.'9 Adams worked for Circuit City. When he applied for a
job there, there was a part of the application form that said that any dispute
with Circuit City arising out of his employment would go to binding arbitration. He worked there for two years, and he later believed he had suffered discrimination on the basis of his race and his gender. He went to a
lawyer, and the lawyer decided that he wanted to keep the case out of federal court. He believed that it was much more likely to succeed in California state court. So Adams sued in state court only under California antidiscrimination claims. He did not bring any federal claims.
You know from your first year civil procedure class that if you sue in
state court on state law claims and if there is no diversity of citizenship, the
case cannot be removed to federal court. Circuit City filed a lawsuit in
federal court under the Federal Arbitration Act to compel arbitration. The
Federal Arbitration Act is a statute, adopted in 1925, that provides for the
19. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001).
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enforcement of arbitration agreements, but it has an exception. The exception includes employees engaged in interstate commerce. This would seem
to be a good defense for Adams. Circuit City, at least at the time, they no
longer exist, was a business engaged in interstate commerce. Given how
the Supreme Court has defined interstate commerce since 1937, it would
certainly fit. But the Supreme Court in a 5-4 decision ruled against Adams.
Once more, the court was split on ideological lines. Once more, the majority was Justices Rehnquist, O'Conner, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. And
the Supreme Court said that the arbitration would be compelled. The Supreme Court construed "employees" in interstate commerce to only be
those in the transportation industry. If you look at the statute, it certainly
refers to transportation workers, but then there is an "and." It says, "employees engaged in interstate commerce." It seems broad and inclusive, but
the Supreme Court decided it had to go to arbitration.
I will give you one more example of a case of this sort: Buckeye Check
Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna.20 Buckeye is a small business in Florida that
cashes checks primarily for day laborers. It charges a large fee when you
cash a check. A person who goes to cash a check with them has to sign an
agreement that any dispute can go to arbitration. I will confess to you, I
have not studied contract law since I was a first year law student in 1975.
The little bit I remember is that if anything is an unconscionable contract,
this is it. If anything is the antithesis of a bargained for exchange, this is it.
Day laborers going in to cash their check and in exchange having to sign an
agreement that the matter goes to arbitration is not a bargained for exchange. The question was whether a court could declare this to be unconscionable? Or did the issue of unconscionability have to go to arbitration?
The Florida Supreme Court said whether the contract is valid is the threshold question, and it would be for the court to decide whether it was unconscionable. And the Florida courts found that, not surprisingly, it is an unconscionable contract. The United States Supreme Court reversed. The Supreme Court said the question of whether it is an unconscionable contract
has to go to arbitration. In other words, it was the arbiter who was going to
decide whether the arbiter would get to decide the case. Again, think of the
individuals with no access to the courts. Once more, the courthouse doors
are getting slammed shut.
I have talked about four examples this afternoon. I have talked about
how much harder it is for injured individuals to sue federal officials-like
in the Valerie Plame and Joe Wilson case. I talked about the heightened
pleading requirements. I talked about the expansion of sovereign immunity. I talked about the shift in cases from litigation to arbitration. If there
20. Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna , 546 U.S. 440 (2006).
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were more time I could pick so many other examples where procedural
devices have been used to close the courthouse door. I could talk about
how standing has been limited to not allow injured individuals their day in
federal court. There has been a tremendous expansion to the scope of immunity, including absolute immunity when government officials are sued,
making it much harder for lawsuits to go forward. I could tell you how
much harder it is for injured plaintiffs to recover attorney's fees under the
federal civil rights statutes.
What all of these examples share in common is that they never make
headlines in the New York Times or any other newspaper. When the Supreme Court makes it harder to bring a Bivens suit, tightens pleading requirements, expands sovereign immunity, or shifts cases to arbitration, no
one pays attention. It is technical. It is too legalistic. To me, what makes
this so insidious is that rights are being taken away by denying a forum
without people even being aware of it. To be sure, rights are meaningless if
there is not remedy. That was the point that Marbury v. Madison made all
those years ago: If there is a right, there should be a remedy. If there is no
court available, is there realistically any remedy?
We all learn from junior high school civics on that the great thing
about our country is if there is an injured person, that individual has his
right to his or her day in court. All too often that is becoming a myth.
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